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Gatekeeping Post-Uniloc: Expert 
Testimony in Multi-Component Patent 
Litigation 
Erika Mayo*
 
 
A strong patent system has historically supported extraordinary growth in 
the United States’ technology industry.  Striking a balance between patentee 
compensation and the public interest in a competitive market, the system, as 
envisioned, rewards an inventor only for his contribution to the state of the 
art.  But current advances in technology typically represent incremental 
improvement on prior inventions, and often constitute merely one of 
hundreds of components of a device.  With device sales in the millions or 
billions, it is unsurprising that parties bitterly contest the methodology for 
calculation of patent damages.  Under the present system, each party is 
incentivized to seek out the “best expert money can buy.”  Confounded 
juries have recently awarded nine and ten figure sums for relatively trivial 
contributions.  This overcompensation of patentees upsets the intended 
balance in the patent system.  In recent years, the Federal Circuit has made 
an effort to rein in excessive or unfounded patent damages awards.  In 
Uniloc v. Microsoft, the Federal Circuit granted a motion for retrial on the 
issue of damages, rejecting the validity of plaintiff’s damages expert 
testimony.  This note advocates a broad reading of Uniloc and encourages 
trial courts to take a greater role in providing juries with sound methodology 
for assessing damages.  Specifically, this note encourages the use of court-
appointed damages experts to restore predictability in the U.S. patent 
system. 
 
 
  
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of California Hastings College of the Law.  This note was 
made possible by the support and guidance of Professor Roger C. Park, for which the author is 
humbly grateful.  The author also wishes to thank Zach Lloyd and Alfredo Amoedo for their 
editorial assistance, and Kerry L. Konrad for everything, always. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Technology is big business.  In 2012, Apple sold more than 100 
million iPhones and over 50 million iPads, boasting fourth quarter 
revenues of almost $36 billion.1  Sales of Android devices have been 
similarly steady in the billions.2  Qualcomm, a wireless chip-maker, 
has drastically outpaced revenue expectations due to extraordinary 
demand.3  Recent earnings across the technology sector are at an 
historic high, and continued growth is expected.4
A booming American technology industry is arguably due, in 
part, to a strong patent system.  Indeed the Congressional power to 
issue patents stems from its Constitutional mandate to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.”
 
5  A patent grants an inventor 
the “right to exclude”—the ability to keep others from practicing his 
invention for a period of time.  This right is also known as a “limited 
monopoly.”  The limited monopoly is designed as an incentive: The 
inventor must disclose his invention to the public in order to obtain 
and enforce his rights.6  In exchange for disclosure, the inventor 
enjoys the ability to price his invention in the absence of 
competition.7  The inventor may also choose to transfer this 
monopoly right via limited or exclusive licenses.8
Embedded in this system is a dated conception of what 
constitutes “invention.”  As written, the system envisions the 
  To be effective, this 
exchange (or quid pro quo) must balance between promoting 
disclosure and protecting the public from unwarranted monopolies. 
 
 1. Earnings Releases, APPLE, http://investor.apple.com/results.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 
2013).  
 2. Eric Zeman, Google Races Toward 1 Billion Activations, INFORMATIONWEEK (Sept. 
12, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/hardware/handheld/google-races-toward-1-billion-
android-ac/240007197.  
 3. Sinead Carew, Qualcomm posts higher profits, raises FY targets, REUTERS (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/qualcomm-posts-higher-profit-raises-212248270.html 
(“The biggest supplier of cellphone chips reported a profit $1.395 billion, or 81 cents per share,  
for its fiscal first-quarter, ended December 25, compared with a profit of $1.17 billion, or 71 
cents per share, in the year-ago quarter.”). 
 4. Jack Hough, Why Tech Stocks Look Better—Even For the Risk Averse, WSJ (Jan. 28, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203363504577186973426913812.html?KE 
YWORDS=intel+earnings (“With 37 percent of S&P 500 companies having announced 
December-quarter earnings results, 68 percent of the technology companies that have reported 
have beaten analysts’ estimates, versus 59 percent for the index and 40 percent for consumer-
staples companies, according to a Friday report from Thomson Reuters.”). 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 6. For a discussion of the economics behind the limited monopoly incentive, see generally 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
 7. See Demsetz, supra note 6, at 354–55.  
 8. See id. at 352–53.  
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“invention” as a new device or machine.9  For the Founders, “if you 
put technology in a bag and shook it, it would make some noise.”10  A 
recent shift towards intangible and incremental invention, however, 
means that modern technology rarely fits the Founders’ description.  
Advances are largely in the chemical, biotechnological and software 
arenas.  Moreover, typical modern technology—the thing that makes 
noise when you shake it—is not a stand-alone tool but an amalgam of 
many components.  Each component can contain components, and so 
on.  Each part of the greater invention might be the product of a 
different inventor, covered by a separate patent or several 
overlapping patents.11
Complex end-user technology products, like Apple’s iPhone, are 
comprised of hundreds and even thousands of patentable 
components.
 
12  This market reality raises practical concerns for the 
operation of the patent system, which historically envisioned a device 
or machine covered by a single patent.13  More specifically, it has 
become increasingly difficult to calculate the true value of a patented 
technology for the purpose of negotiating licensing agreements, as 
well as assessing appropriate damages for infringement.  Similarly, 
the “right to exclude” may over-compensate component and 
incremental inventors.  While the value of a patented technology 
should correlate to its incremental contribution to the end-product,14
 
 
[t]he threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will 
force the downstream producer to pull its product from the market 
can be very powerful.  These threats can greatly affect licensing 
negotiations, especially in cases where the injunction is based on a 
patent covering one small component of a complex, profitable, and 
popular product.15
 
 
With end-product sales in the billions, it is unsurprising that the 
methodology for calculation of patent damages has been bitterly 
 
 9. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1992 (2007). 
 10. Id. at 1991–92 (quoting Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before 
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999). 
 11. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1992. 
 12. Thomas F. Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent 
Infringement Litigation, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725, 726–27 (2011). 
 13. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1992. 
 14. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating 
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 639 (2010). 
 15. Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern 
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 786–88 (2007). 
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contested.16  Jury awards for patent infringement have, in recent 
years, reached nine and even ten figures.17  These figures reflect an 
average royalty rate of over thirteen percent—significantly higher 
than the average negotiated license.18  Since 2007, observers have 
noted efforts by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to “rein 
in” astronomical patent damages awards.  Under Chief Justice Rader, 
the Court has edged its decisions closer to a rational market model 
for assessing damages.19  Specifically, the Court has sought to limit 
admissibility of irrelevant sales and market data where such data is 
likely to distract or confuse the jury from the proper calculation.20
In January of 2011, the Federal Circuit granted Microsoft’s 
motion for retrial on the issue of damages in Uniloc v. Microsoft, 
rejecting on Daubert grounds the validity of expert testimony based 
on the “25-percent rule of thumb” for calculating patent damages.
 
21  
Prior to this decision, the rule provided a basis for calculating the 
“reasonable royalty” at one-quarter of the total market value of the 
product containing the infringing technology.22  The Uniloc decision 
also sought to clarify earlier precedent on admissibility under the so-
called “Entire Market Value Rule”; the Court prohibited 
introduction of market data where the plaintiff failed to illustrate that 
the patented feature created the market demand for the entire 
product.23
But Uniloc only provides the outer limits of permissible damages 
evidence—what not to do.  The damages calculus remains unwieldy in 
two primary respects:  (1) the Federal Circuit adheres to a nebulous 
fifteen-factor “test” for computing damages,
  As discussed in detail below, Uniloc represents a 
substantial shift in the landscape for patent damages calculations.  
Implications of the decision have not gone unnoticed: District courts 
will be expected to scrutinize expert evidence on the issue of patent 
damages for both relevance and reliability. 
24 and (2), the trial court 
enjoys broad discretion in determining the appropriate methodology.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit applies the highly deferential “abuse 
of discretion” standard,25
 
 16. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 628.  
 resulting in rarely disturbed, but often 
 17. Cotter, supra note 12, at 725–26  (noting that, of nine awards exceeding $100 million 
since 2007, not all have survived post-judgment motions or appeal). 
 18. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2032. 
 19. Cotter, supra note 12, at 750–51.  
 20. Id. at 752.   
 21. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 22. Cotter, supra note 12, at 730. 
 23. Id. at 732. 
 24. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629–30.  While the author agrees with innumerable 
commentators that the Georgia-Pacific test has significant flaws, this note is not focused on a 
critique of the governing legal standard.   
 25. Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 517 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
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inexplicable, jury awards.26  What results is a lack of meaningful 
appellate guidance and an unpredictable economic landscape.27
Proper assessment of damages is of the utmost importance in 
protecting the validity of our patent system.  Inconsistent 
compensation diminishes the economic justification for enforcing 
patent rights.
 
28  While the patent damages problem is widely 
recognized, an absence of Congressional consensus has resulted in 
little reform.29
 
  In the wake of Uniloc, this note advocates greater 
involvement by the district courts in policing the data presented for 
the jury’s consideration.  Part II outlines the current state of patent 
damages law under the Federal Circuit.  Part III discusses expert 
testimony in the patent context, and Daubert’s evidentiary 
restrictions.  Part IV summarizes the Uniloc v. Microsoft decision.  
Finally, Part V advocates greater role for Rule 706 experts in an 
effort to ensure reasonable damages calculations post-Uniloc. 
II. THE PATENT DAMAGES LANDSCAPE 
 
Relevance of certain expert testimony, and the propriety of 
court-appointed experts, must be considered in context of the 
governing standards for assessing damages.  The calculation of 
damages for patent infringement is governed by 35 U.S.C. 284, which 
states, “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the 
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but 
in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer.”  Courts have long held that damages can 
be either the patentee’s lost profits, or the reasonable royalty he 
would have received through arm’s-length bargaining.30  The burden 
of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence falls on the 
patentee.31
 
 
 
 
 26. Lucent Technologies Inc. v. Gateway, 580 F.3d 1301, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“We review 
the jury’s determination of the amount of damages, as an issue of fact, for substantial evidence.  
A jury’s decision with respect to an award of damages must be upheld unless the amount is 
grossly excessive or monstrous, clearly not supported by the evidence, or based only on 
speculation or guesswork.”). 
 27. Amy L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and Sequential 
Invention, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 472 (2012). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 471–72.  
 30. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. 
 31. Id. 
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A.  LOST PROFITS 
 
To recover lost profits, a patentee must show that “but for the 
infringing acts, the patent owner would have made the sales and 
would have made a certain level of profit.”32  Four elements must be 
proved by the patentee to establish entitlement to lost profits: (1) a 
demand for the patented product; (2) the absence of an acceptable, 
non-infringing substitute for the patented product; (3) the patentee’s 
manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand for the 
patented product; and (4) the amount of profit the patentee would 
have expected to make if he had made the infringer’s sales.33  Lost 
profits established by this test are limited by “reasonable, objective 
foreseeability,” but can include lost profits for sales of products not 
covered by the patent.34
 
 
B.  REASONABLE ROYALTY 
 
Where a patentee is unable to show lost profits or an established 
royalty rate, he is nevertheless entitled to a reasonable royalty.35  The 
Federal Circuit recognizes several approaches for this calculation, 
while conceding that any reasonable royalty analysis is necessarily 
uncertain.36  The court noted that “where an established royalty rate 
for the patented inventions is shown to exist, the rate will usually be 
adopted as the best measure of reasonable and entire 
compensation.”37  A single licensing agreement is not enough to 
demonstrate uniformity or acquiescence in the reasonableness of the 
rate.38  Licenses negotiated in the face of a threat of litigation are 
similarly not sufficient to provide an “established” rate.39
The most common approach to assessing damages is the 
“hypothetical negotiation,” which attempts to determine what the 
parties would have agreed upon, had they negotiated an arm’s-length 
license at the time of infringement.
 
40
 
 32. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1165 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). 
  The hypothetical negotiation 
assumes that the patent is valid and infringed, and tries to “recreate 
 33. Id. 
 34. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1546–67 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 35. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. 
 36. Id. at 1324–25.  
 37. Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing 
Tektronix, Inc., v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 347 (Ct. Cl. 1977)). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 1078–79.  
 40. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1324. 
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the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the 
resulting agreement.”41 The Federal Circuit has adopted the Georgia-
Pacific framework for analyzing patent damages, which consists of a 
fifteen-factor test.42  Under this test, the trial court must consider 
“sound economic proof of the nature of the market” and the claimed 
invention’s value therein.43
The hypothetical negotiation is flexible.  A court may look to 
“events and facts that occurred [after the time infringement began] 
and that could not have been known to or predicted by the 
hypothesized negotiators.”
 
44  Importantly, the Georgia-Pacific factors 
are nonexclusive and each factor may not apply to every case.45  In 
every case, however, the patentee must give evidence “tending to 
separate or apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentees 
damages between the patented feature and the unpatented features, 
and such evidence must be reliable and tangible, and not conjectural 
or speculative.”46  While the defendant is presumed, in the 
hypothetical negotiation, to be a “willing licensee,” the law “does not 
require that an infringer be permitted to make a profit.”47  Further, a 
patentee’s demonstrated unwillingness to grant an unlimited license 
may support a higher award.48
Though beyond the scope of this note, it should be recognized 
that the existing damages standards have been roundly attacked.
 
49  
Courts have described the royalty calculation as “‘involv[ing] more 
the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge.’”50
 
 41. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325. 
  At best, the 
present standards are complex and open to competing 
interpretations.  This complexity invites parties to fashion their 
analyses to reach an optimal number by selecting which factors to 
include.  Under the current system, a jury might hear competing 
 42. Hanson, 718 F.2d at 1077. 
 43. ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 44. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana 
Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 45. Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1575.  
 46. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 47. Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Erick S. Lee, Reconsidering Reasonable Royalty Damages Methodology in 
Patent Infringement Suits: Supplementing Georgia Pacific with the Reasonable Royalty 
Determination Board, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 104 (2010) (“The Georgia Pacific 
test has been criticized for its difficulty in applicability, and the concern that consequently 
patentees are not adequately compensated for the infringement.”). 
 50. Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 38 (2001). 
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damages theories based on entirely inconsistent inclusion of factors, 
any number of which they may properly consider.  
 
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY 
 
Section 284 expressly provides for the use of expert testimony 
“as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would 
be reasonable under the circumstances.”  Given the complexity of this 
assessment, juries often rely on calculations put forth by the parties’ 
experts in arriving at an award.  It is thus no surprise that expert 
testimony is a prominent feature of nearly every patent trial.51  Many 
patent cases call for both accounting experts and industry and 
licensing experts.52  Additional experts, including economists, may be 
employed depending on the theory of damages advanced at trial.53
Under the common law, admissibility of expert testimony was 
analyzed under the “general acceptance” standard.  To be admitted 
under that standard, the methodology leading to an expert’s opinion 
had to be “sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance 
in the particular field in which it belongs.”
 
54
The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975.  Rule 702 
provides the general standard for admission of expert testimony: 
 
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an 
opinion or otherwise if: 
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue; 
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and 
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 
the facts of the case.55
Adoption of Rule 702 resulted in a conflict as to whether 
“general acceptance” remained the correct standard.  In 1993, in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 51. Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 
1, 3 (1999). 
 52. Id. at 17. (“For example, where a reasonable royalty is sought the licensing or industry 
expert will testify to the royalty rate and the proper methodology of computing royalties. The 
accountant, if retained, will then perform the actual calculations.”). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 55. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
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found that Frye had been displaced by the Federal Rules.56  In 
Daubert, minors and their guardians sued a pharmaceutical company 
for birth defects allegedly resulting from the mothers’ ingestion of the 
drug Bendectin.57  The defendant provided testimony of an expert on 
the “risks from exposure to various chemical substances.”58  The 
expert stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and 
human birth defects and no study had found Bendectin capable of 
causing birth defects.59
The plaintiffs provided contradictory testimony from eight of 
their own experts.  These experts based their opinions on test tube 
and live animal studies, chemical comparisons, and a reanalysis of 
published statistical studies.
 
60  The district court found that these 
experts’ opinions would not be admissible under the “generally 
accepted” test and granted the defendant’s motion.61  The Supreme 
Court ultimately reversed, finding that “nothing in the text of [Rule 
702] establishes ‘general acceptance’ as an absolute prerequisite to 
admissibility.”62
Before admitting scientific
  The Court also held, however, that Rule 702 places 
limits on the admissibility of expert evidence.  The trial judge was 
accordingly assigned the role of gatekeeper.  As such, the judge “must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is 
not only relevant, but reliable.” 
63 expert testimony, the judge must 
apply a two-part test: (1) “[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must 
be ‘scientific knowledge’”, and (2) the expert testimony must “assist” 
the trier of fact.64  The first requirement relates to trustworthiness, 
while the second is directed to relevance.  Expert testimony must be 
“relevant to the task at hand”—it must “fit” the facts of the case.  To 
apply this validity/reliability test, Daubert encourages the court to 
consider four non-exclusive factors: (1) whether the expert’s method 
has been tested; (2) the reliability of the expert’s method and its 
potential rate of error; (3) whether the method has been published, 
and/or the subject of peer review; and finally (4) whether the method 
is generally accepted in a relevant scientific community.65
 
 56. 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). 
 These 
 57. Id. at 582. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 583. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 588. 
 63. Id. at 579, 590 n. 8 (1993).  In a footnote, the Daubert Court elucidated the parameters 
of its holding, stating: “Rule 702 also applies to ‘technical, or other specialized knowledge.’ Our 
discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the expertise offered 
here.”  Id.  
 64. Id. at 592. 
 65. Id. at 593–94.  
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considerations are designed to safeguard the jury from “absurd and 
irrational pseudoscientific assertions,” while avoiding undue restraint 
on the search for truth. 
The Court elucidated its Daubert holding in General Electric Co. 
v. Joiner.  The appropriate standard of review on Daubert rulings was 
deemed to be the “abuse of discretion” standard.66  The Court also 
reaffirmed the need for experts to sufficiently tie methodology to the 
facts of the case.67  An expert’s bare assertion that this requirement is 
satisfied may be insufficient;68 “nothing in either Daubert or the 
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion 
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the 
expert.”69  The trial court has discretion to rule that there is “simply 
too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered.”70  Two years later, in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 
the Court extended the Daubert gatekeeping mandate to non-
scientific expert evidence.71  Validity and reliability of an expert’s 
methodology must be reviewed regardless of whether the expert is a 
“technical,”  “experience-based,” or “scientific” expert.72
Experts testify in a majority of civil jury trials.
 
73  In most cases, 
experts are proffered by both sides.  Even with the Rule 702 and 
Daubert safeguards, there can be no guarantee of the validity of 
expert testimony.74  On the contrary, expert testimony continues to be 
viewed with a cautious eye.  More cautious, some argue, than other 
testimony received at trial.  There are several reliability dangers 
specific to expert testimony.75
The lawyers on each side of a dispute, acting in secret, choose 
people from an almost indefinitely large array and designate them 
  Professor Samuel R. Gross provides a 
“thumbnail sketch” of the method of use of expert testimony, 
illustrating the need for skepticism: 
 
 66. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1119 (1991). 
 74. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (holding that the judge must 
make a “preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”).  i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 854 (2010). 
 75. Gross, supra note 73, at 1114–15 (“Reading the comments of lawyers and judges, it is 
easy to get the impression that expert witnesses are intruders who disrupt the judicial search for 
truth.  This is false, of course.  As Karl Menninger pointed out, the expert ‘is not self invited to 
these parties.  He is not a trespasser.  He is called, then he is questioned, criticized, disputed, 
attacked, suspected, disregarded and ridiculed.’  The expert witness that lawyers vilify is a 
creature of their own creation.”). 
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as the witnesses; these witnesses are paid handsomely for their 
testimony; lawyers can preemptively hire witnesses in order to keep 
them from testifying when their honest testimony might help the 
other side; many witnesses make a business of testifying, and 
advertising their services; the attorneys control the information and 
the issue on which their witnesses testify; witnesses are allowed to 
testify to matters beyond their personal knowledge and to evaluate 
as well as present information; the existing rules of pretrial 
discovery are curtailed so that the identity and the evidence of 
many potential witnesses can be concealed from the opposing 
party; the usual rules of evidence are inapplicable at trial; and, 
finally, the subject matter of the testimony by these witnesses is 
intrinsically confusing, if not incomprehensible, to judges and 
jurors.76
This system allows for the grooming of witnesses for the benefit 
of one party, while accepting these witnesses to be presented to the 
jury as learned specialists.  The road to a civil trial is thus akin to a 
bidding war—each side is incentivized to procure the best testimony 
money can buy.  This problem is compounded by the fact that a 
majority of expert testimony is given by testifying experts who are 
“repeat players,”
 
77 familiar with the grooming and adversarial 
processes.  Many are more familiar, even, than the lawyers doing the 
questioning.78
Studies have shown that juries are likely to attribute substantial 
weight to the opinions of experts.
  Where the damages stakes are high, it is understood 
that both parties will shell out substantial sums for the “right” expert 
testimony. 
79  Laypersons are accustomed to 
receiving advice from experts, and relying on that advice as sound.80  
Outside the courtroom, when faced with a question about which one 
has no background or experience, the guidance of an expert is 
undoubtedly warranted.  The jury brings this understanding of an 
expert—the neutral, guiding specialist—to trial, where experts are not 
paid to be neutral.  While some argue that the adversarial system is 
enough to dispel these dangers, the unique circumstance of the expert 
witness casts doubt on this proposition.  Experts are selected, in large 
part, because they are convincing.81
 
 76. Gross, supra note 73, at 1125. 
  A low-credibility expert is 
 77. Id. at 1191,  
 78. Id. (“Judging from 1985-86 cases, when an attorney examines a witness in a civil jury 
trial in California, the expert is twice as likely to have testified in another such case in the 
preceding six months as the attorney is to have tried one (42 percent to 21 percent).”). 
 79. Jane Goodman, Edith Green & Elizabeth F. Loftus., What Confuses Jurors in Complex 
Cases, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 65 (1985).   
 80. Christopher Tarver Robertson, Blind Expertise, 176 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 183–84 (2010). 
 81. RICHARD LEMPERT, CIVIL JURIES AND COMPLEX CASES: TAKING STOCK AFTER 
TWELVE YEARS 9 (Ctr. for Research on Soc. Org. Working Paper Series, November 1992), 
available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/51254/5/488_1.pdf. 
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unlikely to be called to the stand.82
Expert testimony dangers are of particular concern in a damages 
determination.  The jury is here not asked to decide a yes or no 
question such as “Brakes failed or didn’t they?  Pill caused defect, or 
didn’t it?”  Instead, the jury is asked to come up with a value.  That 
value need not match the findings of either party’s expert.
  Moreover, an attack on the 
witness’s academic credibility may not be enough to discredit his 
convincing methodology or conclusion, however erroneous. 
83  An 
adversarial attack on an expert’s credibility thus provides little aid to 
the jury in determining the proper figure.  Unlike in a yes-or-no 
scenario, the mere fact that one party’s witness is “wrong” does not 
necessarily mean the other party’s witness is “right.”  The average 
juror, who has never been party to a licensing agreement, is left to 
fend for himself.  The jury’s befuddlement is often apparent.  For 
example, in Lucent v. Gateway, the jury awarded $357,693,056.18 in 
lump-sum damages, suggesting at the very least their 
misunderstanding of the “lump-sum” versus “running royalty” award 
(a lump-sum agreement would almost never contain a number out to 
the penny).84  On appeal, the Federal Circuit is often left to speculate 
as to how the jury arrived at its figure.85
Flawed expert testimony can be dangerous in another way.  By 
presenting the jury with a complex set of data, organized convincingly 
to result in a quantitative conclusion, the expert can obfuscate the 
assumptions underlying his calculation.  One example of this 
phenomenon is the frequently invoked “Nash bargaining” theory.
 
86  
Nash bargaining attempts to quantify the economic values underlying 
a hypothetical negotiation and solve for what portion of the gains 
achieved through agreement would be allotted to each party.87  To 
explain Nash bargaining, the expert assigns letters or mathematical 
symbols to reflect (1) the value of the patented feature (as compared 
to the next-best alternative), (2) the margin (or net profit) on each 
patented unit, (3) the strength of the patent (probability that it will be 
found valid and infringed),88
 
 82. Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification for Restrictions on the 
Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33(4) SETON HALL L. REV. 881, 907 (2003). 
 (4) the cost of redesigning the end-
 83. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs, 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“A 
court is not restricted in finding a reasonable royalty to a specific figure put forth by one of the 
parties.”). 
 84. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
 85. See, e.g., Wordtech Sys., Inc. v. Integrated Networks Solutions, Inc., 609 F.3d 1308, 1321 
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (the 
jury may have “used the $19 billion figure to ‘check’ its significant award of $388,000,000.”). 
 86. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1995–96 (referring to Nash Bargaining as a 
“standard economic theory”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id.  While the reasonable royalty calculation assumes the patent is valid and infringed, it 
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product to avoid reading on the patent,89 (5) the percentage of the 
infringer’s sales that would be lost by issuance of an injunction,90 and 
finally (6) the bargaining skill of the patent holder.91  Importantly, 
bargaining skill is expressed as a “fraction of the combined gains from 
settling (or licensing), rather than litigating.”92  The greater the 
bargaining skill of the patentee, the more he recoups of that 
combined gain.   A common underlying assumption is that the parties 
bring equal bargaining power to the negotiation (expressed as a 
percentage, or 0.5).93  Of course, there are innumerable reasons why 
parties would not bring equal bargaining power to the table.  
Nevertheless, this assumption is built into the equation—literally 
buried in Greek.  The jury is presented with a complex mathematical 
structure containing a significant yet unfounded assumption.94
One scholar summarizes the added problem that juries are 
tempted to offset apparent biases: “If the task were to estimate the 
value of coins in a jar, and one partisan expert said ‘$50’ and the other 
partisan expert said ‘$100,’ a fact-finder might reasonably believe that 
the true value is around $75.  However, this tactic breaks down 
whenever one expert is more honest than the other.  Indeed, the 
tactic punishes such honesty.”
 
95
The patentee’s expert will opine that every penny the infringer ever 
made was due to the patent.  The infringer’s expert will opine that 
since the infringer did not really need the patent anyway a 
reasonable royalty would be a flat fee somewhere in the 
neighborhood of pocket change.
  Another scholar notes: 
96
The fear that a jury will “split the difference” may discourage 
hired experts from exercising restraint in their opinions.  The result is 
extraordinary divergence in the values proposed by the parties. 
  
Most jury damages awards have been upheld on appeal.97
 
would not be possible for the negotiating parties to know this with any degree of certainty 
absent litigation. 
  
Recently, the Federal Circuit has illustrated an effort to curb expert 
testimony that attempts to introduce irrelevant or speculative 
evidence in assessing patent damages.  In 2010, in Lucent v. Gateway, 
 89. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1995–96. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 798 F. Supp 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“The Nash 
bargaining solution would invite a miscarriage of justice by clothing a fifty-percent assumption 
in an impenetrable facade of mathematics.”). 
 95. Robertson, supra note 80, at 191. 
 96. Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein In The Georgia-
Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 30 (2008). 
 97. Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).   
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the Federal Circuit reviewed the jury’s award of over $357 million as 
a “reasonable royalty” for an infringing component of Microsoft 
Outlook.  Outlook is a successful software program for creating 
computer spreadsheets.  The component at issue was the “date-
picker” function of Outlook, which allows users to employ a drop-
down menu in lieu of keyboard entry.98  The total dollar value of the 
sales for the infringing software program was approximately $8 
billion.99  Lucent’s expert based the damages calculation on 8 percent 
of sales revenue for the software, and it asked the jury to award 
$561.9 million.100  Microsoft’s expert opined that a lump-sum payment 
of $6.5 million would have resulted from a hypothetical negotiation.101
Notably, because Microsoft had failed to object to introduction 
of Lucent’s expert evidence at trial, the court was limited in Lucent to 
a review of the jury’s award under the more demanding “substantial 
evidence” standard.
 
102  The court nevertheless held that the damages 
award was not supported by the evidence.  The court found that 
Lucent’s expert had incorrectly urged the jury to speculate as to what 
the proper lump-sum damages award would be.103  The court further 
held that Lucent’s had improperly relied upon unrelated prior license 
agreements.  The court stated “the law does not require an expert to 
convey all his knowledge to the jury about each license agreement in 
evidence, but a lump-sum damages award cannot stand solely on 
evidence which amounts to little more than a recitation of royalty 
numbers . . . .”104
Soon after, in ResQNet.com, the Federal Circuit found that 
admission of expert testimony based upon the patentee’s prior 
licenses for unrelated patents was an abuse of discretion.
 
105  The 
defendant’s expert had similarly introduced licenses with insufficient 
relationship to the claimed invention “to drive the royalty rate up to 
unjustified double-digit levels.”106
 
 
 
 
 
 98. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 580 F.3d at 1317.  
 99. Id. at 1323. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1331. 
 102. Id. at 1325. 
 103. Id. at 1327. 
 104. Id. at 1329. 
 105. ResQNet.com v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 868–70, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 106. Id. at 870. 
MAYO (DO NOT DELETE) 3/28/2013  9:08 PM 
Spring 2013 GATEKEEPING POST-UNILOC 553 
IV. UNILOC V. MICROSOFT 
 
The Federal Circuit’s 2011 decision in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp. emphasized and clarified the more stringent 
standards for expert testimony on patent damages.  In Uniloc, the 
court again reviewed a multimillion dollar damage award based on a 
hypothetical negotiation.  Uniloc’s patent covered a system of 
deterring software copying through the use of “product keys.”107  
Product keys allow for remote user monitoring by creating a unique 
“ID” for each user upon registration.108  The information used to 
create this ID is shared with the vendor’s system.  Each time the 
application is loaded, the ID on the user’s computer is compared with 
the legitimate ID stored in the vendor’s system.109  Use of the 
software can accordingly be restricted where copying is identified.110
Uniloc’s expert employed the 25 percent “rule of thumb” to set 
the baseline for the royalty calculation.
 
111  The expert testified that 
the “rule of thumb” had “been accepted by Courts as an appropriate 
methodology in determining damages, in [his] experience, in other 
cases.”112  Microsoft had challenged the 25 percent rule in limine and 
attempted to exclude this testimony.113  Despite noting “the concept 
of a ‘rule of thumb’ is perplexing in an area of the law where 
reliability and precision are deemed paramount,” the district court 
denied Microsoft’s motion because the 25 percent rule had been 
widely accepted.114  The 25 percent rule “approximates” the 
reasonable royalty rate that the manufacturer would be willing to 
offer during a hypothetical negotiation.  The rule supposes a licensee 
would pay a royalty rate equivalent to 25 percent of its expected 
profits for the product that incorporates the patent.115
In addition to applying the 25 percent rule, Uniloc’s expert 
testified that he had “checked” his findings against the total revenue 
for Microsoft’s Office and Windows products—approximately $19 
billion.
 
116
 
 107. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
  Microsoft also objected to this portion of the expert’s 
testimony, arguing that it constituted a misapplication of the Entire 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1311 (“hypothesizing that 25 percent of the value of the product would go to the 
patent owner and the other 75 percent would remain with Microsoft, resulting in a baseline 
royalty rate of $2.50 per license”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 1312. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1311. 
 116. Id. at 1312. 
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Market Value Rule (“EMVR”).117  On this issue, the district court 
agreed, and granted Microsoft’s motion for a new trial on damages.118
Under the EMVR, a patentee may base its reasonable royalty on 
the full commercial value of the device containing the infringing 
component; the total revenue for the infringing product becomes the 
baseline for application of the relevant Georgia-Pacific factors.
 
119  
The EMVR has “typically been applied to include in the 
compensation base unpatented components of a device when the 
unpatented and patented components are physically part of the same 
machine,” but may include separate components where, together with 
the patented components, they constitute “a functional unit.”120   “For 
the [EMVR] to apply, the patentee must prove that the patent-related 
feature is the ‘basis for consumer demand,’” that is to say, the reason 
consumers purchase the whole product.121  The Federal Circuit has 
also allowed application of the EMVR where the patented feature 
“substantially creates the value of the component parts.”122
Microsoft argued that Uniloc’s expert’s pie chart, which 
contained the total revenue number, and Uniloc’s attorneys’ 
“belittlement of Microsoft’s expert’s royalty figure as representing 
only .0003 percent of total revenue” constituted improper invocation 
of the EMVR.
 
123  Neither party sought to show whether the product 
keys covered by the patent “created the basis for customer demand or 
substantially created the value of the component parts.”124
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dispensed with the 25 percent rule 
as a matter of law, holding that it is a “fundamentally flawed tool for 
determining a baseline royalty rate in a hypothetical negotiation” that 
is “inadmissible under Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
because it fails to tie a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case 
at issue.”
 
125  The court emphasized that “one major determinant of 
whether an expert should be excluded under Daubert is whether he 
has justified the application of a general theory to the facts of the 
case.”126
 
 117. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1312. 
  Because the 25 percent rule does not shed light on any 
“particular hypothetical negotiation or reasonable royalty involving 
any particular technology, industry, or party,” the court found that 
 118. Id. 
 119. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1550. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1549. 
 122. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336. 
 123. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1321. 
 124. Id. at 1319. 
 125. Id. at 1315. 
 126. Id. (emphasis added). 
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any expert testimony relying on the rule should be deemed 
inadmissible.127
The Federal Circuit also held that the expert’s use of a $19 billion 
“check” was improper under the EMVR.
 
128  The court highlighted the 
case as an “example of the danger of admitting consideration of the 
entire market value of the accused where the patented component 
does not create the basis for customer demand,” because “[t]he $19 
billion cat was never put back into the bag even by Microsoft’s cross-
examination of [the expert] . . . .”129
The Uniloc decision concludes that the proper damages 
methodology must be an “economically coherent hypothetical 
negotiation tied to the Georgia-Pacific factors and grounded in the 
facts of the particular case.”
 
130  But the “economically coherent” 
standard is amenable to competing interpretations.  Moreover, the 
court’s reaffirmation of the Georgia-Pacific fifteen-factor test will 
allow parties to continue to present juries with competing “apples-to-
oranges” analyses.  While stricter scrutiny of expert testimony is a 
widely anticipated result of Uniloc,131 it remains to be seen what 
evidence will meet the court’s new requirements.132  “Sufficiently 
relevant facts may be hard to find; and the costs to patent holders for 
the economic analysis are likely to be high.”133  If Uniloc provides 
defendants with any safeguard against the dangers of expert 
testimony and the threat of “runaway damages awards,”134
 
 it is an 
emphasis on the gate-keeping function of the judge.  To have a lasting 
effect, trial judges must read Uniloc to invite a more active role of the 
court in shaping the appropriate damages analysis. 
 
 
 127. Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1318. 
 128. Id. at 1320. 
 129. Id. at 1320. 
 130. Roy J. Epstein, Phd, Reasonable Royalty Patent Infringement Damages After Uniloc, 
39 AIPLA Q. J. 3, 13 (2011). 
 131. Id. at 160 (“As a result of these decisions, expert testimony on the amount of a 
reasonable royalty should be subject to higher evidentiary standards.  Benchmark licenses will 
require more careful proof of comparability, and the 25 percent rule will no longer be ‘on call’ 
as a surrogate comparable license.”); see also Thomas Cotter, Reconsidering the Georgia-
Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1661. 
 132. Farrand, Weisberg, Killworth & Shapiro, Reform Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The 
Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357 (2011). 
 133. Id. at 449. 
 134. Id. 
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V. GATEKEEPING POST-UNILOC AND THE RULE 706 
SOLUTION 
 
Uniloc has received substantial attention as well as citation.  
Several courts have expressly acknowledged the heightened review of 
expert testimony.135  Heightened scrutiny has resulted in exclusion of 
expert methodologies deemed to be attempts to couch inadmissible 
assumptions as accepted science.136  However, expert testimony 
dangers linger even in this more stringent landscape.  With fifteen 
factors to choose from, parties can still tailor the damages analysis to 
support unreasonable awards.137
Following Uniloc, trial judges should take a more active role in 
shaping the damages methodology.  One available option is court-
appointment of a testifying expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 
706.  The district courts have too long ignored the Rule 706 expert as 
a viable tool in achieving this oversight.  In Daubert, the Supreme 
Court specifically pointed to Rule 706, which allows the court to enlist 
an expert of its own choosing: 
 
The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party 
enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be 
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The 
court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, 
and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.  An expert 
witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness 
consents to act . . . .  A witness so appointed shall advise the parties 
of the witness’ findings, if any; the witness’ deposition may be taken 
by any party; and the witness may be called to testify by the court 
or any party. The witness shall be subject to cross-examination by 
each party, including a party calling the witness.138
The Rule is interpreted to provide for both technical advisors 
and testifying expert witnesses.  Technical advisors have already been 
widely used in patent litigation for the purpose of educating the 
court.
 
139
 
 135. Inventio v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06-CV-5377, 2011 WL 335905 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 23, 
2011) (McMahon, J.) (“to get the expert’s testimony to the jury, his evidence must comport with 
what seems to me a rather exacting standard”). 
  Court appointed testifying witnesses, however, are very 
rarely employed. 
 136. Oracle, 798 F. Supp 2d at 1120. 
 137. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629. (“With fifteen factors, lawyers can make an 
argument that some combination of factors will support virtually any number an expert (or a 
jury) might come up with.  As long as juries have virtual carte blanche to pick a damages 
number, plaintiffs will continue to have an incentive to shoot for the moon, and the problems of 
excessive damages will continue.”) 
 138. FED. R. EVID. 706. 
 139. Dolly Wu, Patent Litigation: What About Qualification Standards for Court Appointed 
Experts? B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 91501 (2010) (“During 2005-2006, special masters 
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Before adoption of the Federal Rules, many supported the use of 
court-appointed experts to facilitate both judges’ and juries’ 
understanding of scientific and technical evidence.140  In 1920, the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged the trial court’s 
authority under the common law to appoint such experts.141  Court-
appointed witnesses offer several benefits over those appointed by 
the parties.  First and foremost, the appointed expert has no 
allegiance, subconscious or otherwise, to either party.142
Despite these apparent benefits, application of Rule 706 has 
been limited.
  Rather than 
hiding the ball from experts they fear will conclude unfavorably, the 
parties both contribute to informing a court-appointed expert of the 
underlying facts and data.  In this way, a single expert is given 
competing hypotheses to evaluate, instead of molding his opinion to 
meet the needs of his employer. 
143  A 1993 study conducted for the Federal Judicial 
Center sought to determine why judges so rarely make use of this 
tactic.  Many of the judges responding to that study expressed 
concern that appointing an expert would disrupt the adversarial 
process.  Courts have also expressed concern that the “aura” of a 
court-appointment would unduly influence the jury.144  This concern 
is heightened where the factual assessment can be readily applied by 
laypersons.145
Courts should not hesitate to appoint Rule 706 experts in the 
face of astronomically divergent patent damages conclusions.  
Assessing a reasonable royalty requires consideration of economic 
factors with which an average juror is rarely familiar.  The reality of a 
licensing negotiation—a licensing negotiation over a component of a 
component of a component of a technology product—is not “within 
the comprehension of laypersons.”  Section 284 so acknowledges, by 
expressly providing for the use of experts.  To properly envision a 
“hypothetical negotiation,” the jury should be provided an objective 
set of data, rather than two equally unreasonable vignettes.  The 
danger of a “trial by expert” is similarly abated in the patent damages 
 
 
addressed claim construction matters in about 41 percent of 90 cases and infringement or 
invalidity in about 20 percent of the 90 cases.”) 
 140. Sophia Cope, Ripe For Revision: A Critique of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 and the 
Use of Court-Appointed Experts, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 163, 165 (2003). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Gross, supra note 73, at 1220. 
 143. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Wolfgang, Accepting Daubert’s Invitation: Defining a Role 
for Court-Appointed Experts in Asessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY L.J. 995, 1005 (1994). 
 144. See, e.g., Kian v. Mirro Aluminum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351, 356 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (“The 
presence of a court-sponsored witness, who would most certainly create a strong, if not 
overwhelming, impression of ‘impartiality’ and ‘objectivity,’ could potentially transform a trial 
by jury into a trial by witness.”) 
 145. Id. 
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context.  The jury need not reach the same value, or even employ the 
same methodology, as any expert.146
Where complex end-user technology is at issue, the propriety of 
a court-appointed expert is arguably even greater.  In calculating 
damages for component inventions, the reasonable royalty calculation 
requires apportionment between the patented and non-patented 
elements of the infringing product.
  Thus the Rule 706 expert can 
effectively assist without encroaching on (or usurping) the province of 
the fact-finder. 
147  To objectively evaluate the 
contribution of the patented component to the overall value of the 
invention, economic evidence and consumer surveys may be 
required.148  Importantly, consideration of other patented features 
should serve to limit the award.  In the adversarial expert system, 
however, juries rarely hear this crucial evidence.149  As a result, 
reasonable royalty awards for single components are only modestly 
less than awards for patents covering the entire infringing product.150  
An appointed expert lacks the adversarial incentives to withhold 
evidence of other patented features.151
Use of a Rule 706 expert also allows the trial judge to maintain a 
greater degree of control over the methodology for calculating 
damages.  In the typical adversarial expert scenario, the parties may 
offer expert testimony on the basis of completely different sets of 
Georgia-Pacific factors.
  Accordingly, juries are more 
likely to be presented with all of the relevant data by an appointed 
expert. 
152
 
 146. SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991). 
  As a result, the jury cannot make an 
 147. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 2023. 
 148. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 7, at 2024. 
 149. Id. (“Practically, it is not clear that parties have either the ability or the incentive o 
introduce evidence that other patented components contribute to a product’s success. . . . The 
patentee will not introduce such evidence because it would only reduce the royalty rate. The 
accused infringer will often not introduce it because the firm does not want to admit that it 
might be infringing other patented inventions.”) 
 150. Id. at 2034 (“The royalty rate for components is approximately 10.0 percent, compared 
with 13.1 percent for all inventions . . . but this difference is fairly modest.  To see just how 
modest, consider that the reduction in royalty rate for component inventions is equivalent to a 
conclusion that there are on average less than 1.5 components in a multi-component invention.  
Obviously, this does not reflect the commercial reality.”) 
 151. One consideration that should be acknowledged is cost.  Consumer surveys and 
compilation of relevant data does not come cheap.  Pursuant to the Rule, the cost of an 
appointed expert may be borne “by the parties in the proportion and at the time the court 
directs.”  FED. R. EVID. 706.  Thus the court is free, in appointing an expert, to apportion costs 
at its discretion.  Courts should carefully assess the facts and needs of each case in determining 
what costs may reasonably be incurred by the appointed expert and passed through to the 
parties. 
 152. Durie & Lemley, supra note 14, at 629. 
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apples-to-apples comparison of the data presented at trial.  The Rule 
706 expert, incorporating evidence provided by both parties, 
alleviates the jury’s need to sift through unreasonable positions.  
Following Uniloc, at least one court has elected to ameliorate the 
problem of warring experts through the use of a court-appointed 
expert.153  In that instance, the range of expert-derived damages was 
“as much as $6.1 billion” (plaintiff) and “27.8 million” (defendant).154  
The court noted, “far from complicating the jury’s decision on 
damages, the testimony of a 706 expert would assist the jury by 
providing a neutral explanation and viewpoint.”155
Rule 706 affords the court a high degree of discretion and does 
not expressly provide for a standard of qualification for a court 
appointed expert.
 
156
Party appointed witnesses who testify on patent damages have 
diverse backgrounds.  Some are economists or professors who claim 
expertise in bargaining theories.  Others are attorneys or other 
advisors who have participated in licensing negotiations.  Appropriate 
skills will vary with the facts of each case.  In all cases, however, the 
court should seek to appoint an expert whose field of research or skill 
directly relates to the underlying questions.  Failure to properly 
“match” the expert with the task at hand can have embarrassing 
effects on credibility.  In Uniloc, for example, the court noted that 
“upon further questioning, [Uniloc’s expert] revealed that he had 
been involved in only four or five non-litigation related negotiations, 
and had recommended the 25 percent rule only once in a case 
involving a power tool.”  Thus the credibility of the expert and his 
methodology can be called into question by the parties’ failure to 
“match” skills with the facts to be determined.  The trial court, with 
no stake in the ultimate opinion of the expert to be employed, is in a 
better position to assess the soundness of methodology and the 
proper fit for the case at hand.  
  On the issue of patent damages, a court-
appointed expert should be held to a heightened standard of 
experience or specialization than those appointed by the parties.  The 
reasons for a heightened standard are twofold:  (1) the court must be 
mindful of the public trust in the court’s truth-seeking function, and 
(2) as noted above, an appointed witness may greatly influence the 
jury. 
 
 
 153. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. No. 10 CV 03561 Dkt. No. 413 (2011) (Alsup, J.) 
(“The starkly conflicting expert testimony led to appointment under Rule 706 of an 
independent expert to testify as to damages.”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id.  But note, at the time of this writing, Oracle is still pending trial. 
 156. Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. No. 10 CV 03561 Dkt. No. 413 (2011) 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Restoring certainty in damages recovery is crucial to the goals of 
the patent system.  Importantly, both over and under compensation 
are present in the current landscape.157  Where patentees are under-
compensated, the prospective infringer may be better off infringing 
than taking a license.158  This scenario runs directly counter the quid 
pro quo, which seeks to reward inventors through a limited 
monopoly.  On the other hand, when patentees are over-
compensated, the social costs of the patent system increase.159  An 
efficient patent system, consistent with the Constitutional mandate, 
would strike a balance between “preserving incentives for the initial 
inventor and minimizing the detrimental impact to subsequent 
improvers.”160
The appointment of credible, neutral experts will not only aid the 
jury in determining the appropriate compensation for infringement, 
but may serve to usher the parties towards a reasonable settlement.  
The economic justifications for the patent system require certain and 
swift enforcement of the patentees rights.  To restore balance in the 
quid pro quo, the current damages landscape requires greater judicial 
oversight.  Uniloc is an invitation for the district courts to provide 
exactly that. 
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